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Like the other volumes reviewed in this 
section, this book addresses one of the ba-
sic social science questions: What kind(s) 
of human motivation underlie social col-
laboration? Foundations of Human Social-
ity represents a far-reaching endeavour to 
challenge the notion of homo economicus, 
which has been the cement of many inﬂ u-
ential social, economic, and political theo-
ries, as well as game theory, rational choice 
theory, and social exchange theory. This no-
tion entails a conception of human motiva-
tion whereby individuals are self-interest-
ed agents who strive to maximise their own 
utility from a given interaction, expecting 
others to do the same. In other words, they 
reveal a ‘self-regarding’ preference, or de-
sire, to collaborate with others only if the 
collaboration maximises their own utility 
gains. Against this understanding, Founda-
tions of Human Sociality suggests that self-
regarding preferences cannot satisfactorily 
account for frequent instances of pro-social 
behaviour, guided by ‘other regarding’ (so-
cial) preferences. By means of a complex 
laboratory enterprise that included obser-
vation of behaviour in both experimental 
and everyday life conditions, the contrib-
utors speciﬁ ed two main goals for exami-
nation. First, they aim to refute the homo 
economicus notion by showing that, when 
considering collaboration with others, indi-
viduals across different societies are de fac-
to also guided by social preferences, includ-
ing strong reciprocity and fairness. Second, 
they aim to identify socio-cultural and eco-
nomic conditions that shape self-interest 
and other kinds of social preferences. 
The homo economicus notion is em-
pirically refuted through an ambitious re-
search programme conducted by a group 
of scholars from different social science 
disciplines, including economics, anthro-
pology, psychology, and evolutionary bi-
ology. This research programme mainly 
leans on game theory, including variations 
of the Ultimatum Game, Public Goods 
Game and Dictator Game. As reviewed in 
Chapter 3 by Colin Camerer and Ernst 
 Fehr, these games generally assume that, 
when trying to meet their goals and de-
sires, individuals weigh different alterna-
tives (options) and their consequences and 
maximise a preference function. However, 
the book’s research makes a meaningful 
contribution by elaborating the following: 
First, it attempts to shed light on the issue 
of human motivation and social collabora-
tion from an interdisciplinary perspective. 
By crossing age-old disciplinary divides, 
the authors attempt to reach a more com-
prehensive understanding of the dynam-
ics of relations between the individual and 
society. This understanding is achieved not 
only by integrating different disciplinary 
views but also by using different method-
ologies. Speciﬁ cally, the chapters rely both 
on economic experiments and on ethnogra-
phy. This last method, which views culture 
in a more holistic form, unveils socio-eco-
nomic patterns of interaction in everyday 
life and was meant to ascertain to what ex-
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tent they ﬁ t behavioural ﬁ ndings obtained 
by the ‘artiﬁ cial’ laboratory conditions of 
experimental games.
Second, existent experimental games 
have mainly been conducted among ho-
mogenous populations of university stu-
dents across industrial societies (see the 
review by Camerer [2003]). These stud-
ies, which have unveiled relatively similar 
ﬁ ndings broadly supportive of the self-in-
terest axiom, are likely to be biased because 
they characterise the ‘particular’ behaviour 
of relatively high-status young popula-
tions in industrial societies. To overcome 
this limitation and ascertain the extent to 
which these ﬁ ndings can be generalised to 
other type of societies, Foundations of Hu-
man Sociality adopted a far reaching cross-
cultural approach that included respond-
ents across 15 non-Western and small-scale 
societies which varied along a wide range 
of economic and social conditions. For in-
stance, foragers go on multi-week forag-
ing (hunting) treks; horticulturalists rely 
on agriculture, cultivating small gardens 
in combination with ﬁ shing and gather-
ing; and (agro)pastoralists rely on small-
scale sedentary agriculture and herding. 
Some of these societies are now seden-
tary, while others are (semi)nomadic, mov-
ing frequently, staying a few days to a few 
months in a single location.
The book broadens our understanding 
of pro-sociality by proving that the domi-
nant self-interest axiom does not describe 
a part of human nature that is determined 
by ‘universal’ psychological and genetic or 
evolutionary mechanisms. Rather, it is a 
socially learned trait determined by ‘par-
ticular’ economic and socio-cultural condi-
tions. A similar claim was suggested earlier 
by Morton Deutsch [1985] in related stud-
ies of the justice motive and distribution 
preferences, which have been extensively 
examined from a cross-cultural social-psy-
chological and sociological perspective (for 
a recent review see Sabbagh and Golden 
[2007]). Yet the cross-cultural scope of this 
body of literature has been limited to dif-
ferent types of industrial societies. In con-
trast, the unique contribution of the cur-
rent study lies in its attempt to move the 
focus of research related to motivation and 
social collaboration from industrial socie-
ties to ‘truly’ non-Western small-scale so-
cieties. 
The book systematically shows viola-
tions of the self-regarding preference as-
sumption, indicating that respondents in 
small-scale societies also care about fair-
ness and reciprocity in ways that devi-
ate from university student populations 
[Camerer 2003]. For instance, when exam-
ining the dynamics of the Ultimatum Game 
among responders in a rural foraging/hor-
ticulturalist villages in Papua New Guinea 
(Indonesia), David Tracer (Chapter 8) ﬁ nds 
violations of the self-regarding preference 
that seem to correspond to  daily life inter-
actions in that region. In the Ultimatum 
Game, the ‘proposer’ (ﬁ rst player) is grant-
ed a sum of money and s/he can offer any 
portion it to a ‘responder’ (second per-
son). The responder then has the opportu-
nity to accept the offer (s/he then receives 
the amount offered and the proposer re-
ceives the remainder) or to reject it (neither 
player then receives anything). Respond-
ers in the Anguganak and Bogasip villag-
es were willing to sacriﬁ ce their own gains 
by showing high rejection rates (33%) even 
to generous offers by the proposers (the 
mean offer was almost 41%). This ﬁ nding 
was interpreted as an outcome of the val-
ues of generosity that players brought to 
the game from their daily life interactions. 
In these villages, a display of generosity 
by giving out unsolicited gifts (in the form 
of food, clothing, household goods, string 
bags, tools or money) is a valued form of 
interaction. Acceptance of a gift, however, 
binds the gift-giver and gift-acceptor in a 
reciprocal relation, whereby the acceptor 
is expected to repay the debt. In this un-
derstanding, unpaid debts or non-recip-
rocated gifts place acceptors in a subordi-
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nate status. Hence, even large gifts are fre-
quently refused if the receiver is not sure 
s/he will be able to reciprocate (see also 
Gintis et al.’s Moral Sentiments and Materi-
al Interests, reviewed in this section). This 
type of multidisciplinary approach enables 
the book not only to validate behavioural 
ﬁ ndings collected by different methods, 
but also to provide plausible sociological 
or anthropological interpretations for often 
seemingly unintelligible behaviour.
Moreover, ﬁ ndings revealed a large 
amount of cross-cultural group variation 
in distributional preferences, indicating 
that culture does seem to matter in shap-
ing these preferences. This between-group 
variation in experimental play is not ex-
plained by means of individual-level at-
tributes such as gender, age, education, 
and relative wealth, all of which were 
found to have no effect on either propos-
er offers or the responders‘ likelihood of 
rejecting an offer. Rather, group member-
ship and key group-level attributes tied to 
the socio-economic structure of daily in-
teraction, such as the pursuit of a liveli-
hood and common governance, are found 
to play a more crucial role in determining 
these preferences. Two group-level dimen-
sions of social and economic everyday in-
teraction are found to structure pro-social 
behaviour. First, ‘pay-offs to cooperation’ 
refer to economic life that transcends im-
mediate kin and is reﬂ ected in the presence 
and importance assigned to the collabora-
tion with extra-familial institutions. The 
second group-level dimension, ‘aggregated 
market integration’, is composed of three 
different and interrelated aspects of daily 
socio-economic interactions: frequent en-
gagement in market exchange, socio-polit-
ical complexity or centralised extra-famil-
ial decision making, and settlement size. 
Higher levels of payoffs to cooperation and 
aggregated market integration in a given 
society are found to increase pro-social be-
haviour in experimental games, that is, the 
willingness to act beyond self-interest and 
to enter cooperative exchanges in the form 
of fairness and reciprocity. Thus, this type 
of social preferences is likely to assist mar-
ket exchange by ensuring proper behav-
iour by participants, as also suggested by 
Gintis et al.’s Moral Sentiments and Materi-
al Interests. This ﬁ nding is applicable  only 
when considering market exposure on the 
group level. But it is worth noting that sev-
eral surveys have ascertained that indi-
vidual-level variables do matter in this re-
spect [e.g. Wegener and Liebig 1995]. Even 
though the book does not elaborate this is-
sue further, it is important to provide a sat-
isfactory interpretation given the inﬂ uence 
of social structure on individual-level at-
tributes (like being a woman or wealthy 
person). Future research should determine 
whether these ﬁ ndings are a result, for in-
stance, of method artefact (use of experi-
ments vs. survey) or the extent of variance 
on individual-level attributes across differ-
ent types of societies (industrial vs. small-
scale) (e.g. individual-level attributes in in-
dustrial societies are likely to be more het-
erogeneous than in small-scale societies). 
To conclude, Foundations of Human So-
ciality implies a contextualised conception 
of human motivation, whereby individu-
als, when considering social collaboration, 
are not guided by generalised self-regard-
ing or other-regarding (non-rational) pref-
erences, but rather by preferences that are 
context-speciﬁ c – structured by particu-
lar socio-cultural and economic conditions 
that vary both within and between socie-
ties. In doing so, this book moves beyond 
a relatively narrow and micro-level view of 
rational economic man emphasising uni-
versal human traits to a theory of institu-
tion-building that identiﬁ es social struc-
ture conditions that may foster human mo-
tivation and behaviour aimed at achieving 
collective objectives or common (public) 
goods on the basis of rules of fairness and 
reciprocity. This approach, in particular the 
Payoff of Contribution dimension, is re-
markably consistent with Putnam’s [1993] 
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social capital theory, which shows that so-
cial collaboration is built on social networks 
that underlie norms of reciprocity and trust-
worthiness. The development of these pro-
social dispositions is in turn enabled in so-
cieties that further extra-familial ties and 
disregard or transcend purely ‘amoral fa-
milist’ interactions [Banﬁ eld 1958]. 
This research project nevertheless 
leaves several unresolved problems. First, 
there is the problem of causality, which de-
rives from a major theoretical dilemma in 
the social sciences. To what extent are pro-
social dispositions the result of structur-
al constraints, such as market integration, 
or rather an active element in structuring 
these constraints [Giddens 1997]? Joseph 
Henrich (Chapter 2) discusses this prob-
lem on a theoretical level by explaining the 
different mechanisms through which the 
structure of interaction affects preferences. 
Yet only future longitudinal research will 
be able to empirically ascertain to what 
extent, and under which conditions, so-
cial structure shapes human motivation/
preferences. Second, the book relies on the 
questionable idea that the any given indi-
vidual is guided by a consistent and uni-
valent body of motives. This entirely dis-
regards the possibility that people weigh 
several (not necessarily consistent) motives 
at the same time and combine them in var-
ious ways in order to arrive at trade-offs in 
their distribution preferences, and that they 
do so differently in different situations. Fu-
ture research should allow for the possibil-
ity of ambivalent motives and identify the 
conditions that give salience to different 
types of motives and trade-offs. The inno-
vative use of the ethnographic (qualitative) 
methods in this book, which may unveil 
different sorts of motives that remain un-
detected by quantitative methods, should 
therefore be deepened in future studies. Fi-
nally, as suggested by Henrich, the book’s 
ﬁ ndings stimulate an evolutionary puz-
zle to be more fully addressed in future 
work: Why do unselﬁ sh motives evolve in 
the face of the evolutionary logic in which 
material advantages can be achieved by 
adopting self-interested preferences? 
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Imagine a situation in which you are a 
member of a group of four. Each member 
has a monetary endowment of €10. Your 
task is to decide how much of the money 
to contribute to a common group project, 
while you keep for yourself what you do 
not contribute. After everyone has made 
his decision, all contributions to the project 
